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Introduction
The U.S. government's approach to enforcement of international trade
and security policies has recently taken on a new emphasis, and this
change can substantially affect prospects for corporate transactions. In
recent years:
The U.S. government prevented an initial attempt to acquire a U.S.
communications business by Hong Kong and Singapore companies
because of national security concerns about wiretapping.1 The gov-
ernment approved a subsequent attempt only after the removal of
t Harry L. Clark is an attorney with Dewey Ballantine LLP, Washington, D.C.; and
Sanchitha Jayaram is an attorney with Sonnenschein Nath & Rosenthal LLP,
Washington, D.C. Mr. Clark is a graduate of the University of Virginia School of Law
and the University of North Carolina. Ms. Jayaram is a graduate of Northwestern
University School of Law, College of Arts and Sciences, and School of Music.
1. See Dennis K. Berman, Bush Is Expected To Approve Global Crossing Deal, WALL
ST.J., Sept. 9, 2003, at A2; YochiJ. Dreazen and Dennis K. Berman, Who Can Tap Under-
sea Wires Is Key to Merger, WALL ST. J., July 17, 2003, at BI (discussing the U.S. govern-
ment's national security concerns over the Singapore company's efforts to acquire
Global Crossing, the U.S. communications business).
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the Hong Kong company from the transaction and the imposition of
extensive security measures.
2
Several congressional committees held extensive, public hearings
regarding allegations of improper military-related assistance in con-
nection with two U.S. satellite manufacturers' commercial dealings
with Chinese satellite launch service authorities.3 One of the two
companies and its former corporate owner agreed to pay $32 mil-
lion in civil penalties to resolve an administrative enforcement
action that arose from the matter.4
The Commerce Department assessed liability against a company for
alleged export violations committed by another business before the
company acquired that business notwithstanding that: (1) the
acquisition was a purchase of assets rather than the purchase of the
entity that held these assets and (2) the entity that held the assets
continued to exist. 5
Parties to a merger discovered that the target medical supply com-
pany had made irregular payments to foreign government health-
care providers.6 The target company pleaded guilty to Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act violations and paid $2.5 million in penalties
to the Justice Department and the Securities and Exchange
Commission. 7
The U.S. Treasury Department initiated rulemaking proceedings to
implement vastly expanded anti-money laundering policies. 8
The Defense Department withdrew $1 billion in contracts with and
suspended the future government contracting eligibility of a leading
U.S. satellite launch provider due to government bidding viola-
2. See Berman, supra note 1; F.C.C. Clears Global Crossing-S.T.T. Deal, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 2003, at C8, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/abstract.html?res=F0091
EF83D5BOC7A8CDDA90994DB404482 [hereinafter F.C.C.]; Bryan Lee, No Plan B Yet,
Says ST Telemedia, STRAITS TIMES, Aug. 1, 2003, available at http://www.it.asial.com.sg/
newsdaily/news003_20030801 .html.
3. See, e.g., House Report 105-851 of the Select Committee on U.S. National Secur-
ity and Military/Commercial Concerns with the People's Republic of China (May 25,
1999), http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/house/hr105851/; Jeff Gerth, 2 Companies
Pay Penalties for Improving China Rockets, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 5, 2003, at A9.
4. Consent Agreement of Hughes Electronics Corporation and Boeing Satellite Sys-
tems, at 3 (Mar. 4, 2003) (available at the U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Political Military
Affairs and copy on file with authors); see Betsy Taylor, Boeing, Hughes Settle Charges of
Giving Technical Rocket Data to China, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 5, 2003; Renae Merle,
Hughes, Boeing Settle with U.S., WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 2003, at El, available at 2003 WL
15464242.
5. Sigma-Aldrich Business Holdings, Inc., Case Nos. 01-BXA-06, 07, and 11, at 11
(Aug. 29, 2002), http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/CaseSummaries/sigma-aldrich
_alj-decision_02.pdf [hereinafter Sigma-Aldrich] (denying the acquiring company's
motions for summary judgment); Natalia W. Geren et al., Do Due Diligence for Acquisi-
tion. Don't Buy an Enforcement Action, THE EXPORT PRACTITIONER, Sept. 2003, at 4.
6. See infra Part II (regarding Syncor).
7. Id.
8. Infra Part I.F.
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tions. 9 The provider's government contracting eligibility was rein-
stated more than eight months after the penalties were levied. 10
The U.S. government has historically treated enforcement of interna-
tional trade and security restrictions very seriously, but recently has
increased the intensity and breadth of its monitoring and enforcement
efforts. This is attributable to at least two developments. The first and
most important development is the post-September 11, 2001 war on terror-
ism. International trade and security restrictions are considered to be criti-
cal means of fighting this war.1 The Commerce Department's Bureau of
Industry and Security observed in a recent report: "As demonstrated by
recent events, having a modern, coherent, and effective system of dual-use
export controls-to prevent terrorists, rogue states, and proliferators of
weapons of mass destruction from accessing sensitive U.S.-origin goods
and technology-is now more important than ever."'1 2 Similarly, the 2002
National Money Laundering Strategy specifies that "[following the terror-
ist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, we... recog-
nize that the fight against money laundering is integral to the war against
terrorism .... 13
The second development is the recent strengthening of policies and
enforcement regarding corporate ethics and liability. This development
was heralded by the prosecutions of Enron and Arthur Andersen and the
enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley statute. 14 In declaring "a new era of cor-
porate integrity," President Bush has emphasized that "[wie will hold cor-
porate criminals accountable for their misdeeds, and we will deter
corporate crimes by enforcing tough penalties." 15 There is a particular
focus on international business. Secretary of Commerce Donald Evans
recently stated:
Companies must not export bribery and corruption into the markets where
they do business, any more than they would engage in such behavior at
home.
We hope that every country will join us to create an international "no safe
haven" policy that denies corrupt officials the ability to travel freely, launder
9. Renae Merle, U.S. Strips Boeing of Launches, WASH. PosT, July 25, 2003, at Al;
Edward Wong, Lockheed Shooting for Stars as Space Unit Gets Big Break, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug.
2, 2003, at Cl.
10. Andy Pasztor, Boeing Nears Accord on Rocket Work, WALL ST. J., Apr. 5, 2004, at
A3.
11. See, e.g., U.S. Department of Commerce Bureau of Industry and Security,
Streamlining and Strengthening Export Controls, http://www.bxa.doc.gov/eaa.html (last
visited Nov. 16, 2003).
12. Id.
13. U.S. Department of Treasury and U.S. Department of Justice, 2002 NATIONAL
MONEY LAUNDERING STRATEGY 15 (2002), at http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/
docs/monlaund.pdf.
14. 15 U.S.C.S. § 7245; see, e.g., Christina R. Salem, Note, The New Mandate of the
Corporate Lawyer After the Fall of Enron and the Enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, 8
FoRDHn J. Corn'. & FIN. L. 765 (2003).
15. President George W. Bush, Remarks at the Corporate Fraud Conference (Sept.
26, 2002), at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/09/20020926-10.html.
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money and act with impunity. 16
This Article first reviews principal U.S. international trade and secur-
ity policies. These policies include the Exon-Florio Amendment to the
Defense Production Act, export and reexport controls, economic sanctions,
industry security rules, the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, anti-money
laundering requirements, and anti-boycott rules. Next, it examines how
enforcement of these international trade and security policies can affect
corporate transactions and the post-transaction company or companies.
Lastly, this Article discusses steps that parties to transactions can take to
minimize risks in connection with trade and security policies and thereby
successfully complete transactions in the face of those policies.
1. Overview of Relevant International Trade and Security Policies
A. Exon-Florio Amendment
The Exon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act directly
addresses certain types of corporate transactions. The statute authorizes
the President to block non-U.S. acquisitions of and mergers with U.S. busi-
ness operations if they are determined to be a potential threat to U.S. secur-
ity interests. 1 7 The President can order divestment in the case of a
concluded transaction that could threaten U.S. security interests.' 8
Parties to a planned corporate transaction can seek government clear-
ance that would preclude adverse action under the Exon-Florio Amend-
ment.1 9 The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (the
"CFIUS") administers the clearance process. 20 CFIUS is chaired by the
Secretary of Treasury and is comprised of the Secretaries of Commerce,
Defense, Homeland Security, and State, along with the Attorney General
and six White House officials.
2 1
Government examinations under the Exon-Florio Amendment have
been virtually dormant during many years since its enactment in 1988.22
16. Commerce Secretary Donald L. Evans, Remarks at the Third Annual Forum on
Fighting Corruption and Safeguarding Integrity (May 31, 2003), at http://www.osec.
doc.gov/ogc/occic/SecEvans_GFIII.htm.
17. 50 U.S.C. app. § 2170(d) (2000).
18. Id.
19. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.401, 800.402 (2004).
20. 31 C.F.R. § 800.203 (2004).
21. U.S. Department of Treasury, Committee on Foreign Investments in the United
States (CFIUS), Exon-Florio Provision, http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-
affairs/exon-florio/index.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2003) [hereinafter CFIUS]. The
other six White House officials in CFIUS are the Director of the Office of Science and
Technology Policy, the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, the Assis-
tant to the President for Economic Policy, the Director of the Office of Management and
Budget, the U.S. Trade Representative, and the Chairman of the Council of Economic
Advisers. Id.
22. See, e.g., Rick Wartzman, Keep Out: Foreign Moves To Buy U.S. Defense Firms Face
Higher Hurdles, New National Security Law Orders Tighter Scrutiny in Wake of Thomson
Case- Would Clinton Be Tougher?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 2, 1992, at A6 (noting that, before
the Thomson case, CFIUS gave only thirteen out of 700 transactions more than a cur-
sory review).
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In the 1990s, parties typically only bothered to seek a clearance from the
CFIUS if the transaction directly implicated military activity, such as the
acquisition of a defense contractor.
23
The Exon-Florio Amendment has received considerably more attention
in recent years, particularly since the terrorist attacks of September 2001:
In a series of Exon-Florio cases, the Bush Administration has made it clear
that it intends to scrutinize inbound investment more closely and that it
has adopted a broader view of the types of transactions that could threaten
national security. For example, the Defense Department sought to block
acquisition of a semiconductor lithography company, Silicon Valley Group
("SVG"), by the Dutch lithography company ASML. The parties ultimately
obtained a clearance for the transaction, but it required a ruling by the
President himself.2 4
The government also intensely scrutinized several acquisitions of tele-
communications and Internet service companies. These have included
Nippon Telegraph and Telephone's purchase of Verio, 2 5 Vodafone's
purchase of AirTouch, 2 6 and Deutsche Telekom's purchase of VoiceS-
tream. 27 The Hong Kong-based conglomerate Hutchison Whampoa aban-
doned its efforts to acquire the bankrupt U.S. telecommunications
company Global Crossing after encountering severe resistance in the Exon-
Florio clearance process.2 8 Only after a lengthy review and agreement on
extensive network security measures did the President and the Federal
Communications Commission approve Singapore Technologies
Telemedia's acquisition of the U.S. firm. 2 9 Bush Administration officials
contended that the proposed transactions would threaten the national
security even though the principal Global Crossing asset at issue was a
commercial telecommunications network. 30
23. See, e.g., Peter Spiegel, FBI Highlights Concern over Foreign Takeovers: National
Security Fears Dog Company Acquisition Plans, FIN.,TIMES, Jan. 11, 2001, International
Economy, at 9.
24. Press Release, ASM Lithography, ASM Lithography N.V. Completes Acquisition
of Silicon Valley Group, Inc. (May 22, 2001), http://asml.com/NASApp/asmldotcom/
show.do?ctx=5869&rid=981; Press Release, ASM Lithography and Silicon Valley Group
Receive CFIUS Approval To Proceed with Merger (May 3, 2001), http://asml.com/NAS
App/asmldotcom/show.do?ctx=5869&rid=98 2 ; Press Release, Presidential Review
Required for Approval of the Merger of ASM Lithography and SVG (Apr. 24, 2001),
http://asml.com/NASApp/asmldotcom/show.do?ctx=5869&rid=983.
25. See NTT Closes $5.5 Billion Offer for Net-Service Provider Verio, ASIAN WALL ST. J.,
Sept.1, 2000, at 8.
26. See FCC Wireless Bureau Approves Airouch-Vodafone Merger, WASH. TELECOM
NEWS WIRE, June 22, 1999.
27. See Press Release, Hutchison Whampoa Limited, VoiceStream Wireless Notes
Completion of CFIUS Review (May 1, 2001); Telecommunications: U.S. Green Light for
Deutsche Telekom/VoiceSt ream Merger, TECH EUR., May 11, 2001.
28. See Hutchison Whampoa Pulls Out of Global Crossing Deal, TELECOM MARKETS,
May 20, 2003 (Telecom Markets); Berman, supra note 1.
29. See Company News; Global Crossing Sale Clears One U.S. Hurdle, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
20, 2003, at C4, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9E7E 6 DE
113AF933A1575ACOA9659C8B63 [hereinafter Global Crossing]; Berman, supra note 1;
F.C.C., supra note 2.
30. See Berman, supra note 1.
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The process of obtaining clearance can complicate and delay transac-
tions enormously, even when clearance is ultimately provided. The clear-
ance process is designed to last no more than 80 days.3 1 However, the
parties are often forced to withdraw and refile their transaction notifica-
tions, thereby restarting the process, under threat that the transaction will
otherwise be blocked.3 2 In addition, clearance has increasingly been made
contingent on adjustments to the planned transactions and commitments
to take a variety of actions that are deemed to obviate perceived security
concerns. ASML, for example, committed to sell an SVG subsidiary and to
maintain investment in SVG at a specified level, and not to transfer opera-
tions out of the United States to receive clearance for its merger. 33
In the telecommunications acquisitions, the parties have executed
"network security agreements" that authorize the Federal Bureau of Investi-
gation ("FBI") to access facilities for wiretaps and electronic surveillance.3 4
In the Global Crossing cases, the proposed acquirers had signaled a will-
ingness to take extraordinary steps to forestall security concerns in their
efforts to obtain Exon-Florio clearances. Hutchison Whampoa indicated
that it would place its investment interest in a trust controlled by an unre-
lated proxy group comprised of four eminent U.S. citizens. This arrange-
ment would have made Hutchison's interest a completely passive
investment. Nonetheless, Hutchison ultimately withdrew its investment
offer to Global Crossing because it did not believe that an Exon-Florio
clearance was forthcoming.3 5 Singapore Technologies Telemedia received
final approval only after it agreed to an extensive network security agree-
ment, which included, among other measures, a requirement that all cus-
tomer and network data be stored in the United States, appointment of a
third party compliance auditor,3 6 and authorization of U.S. law enforce-
ment agencies to access facilities for wiretaps and electronic surveillance.3 7
Most recently, the CFIUS intensely scrutinized the acquisition of IBM's
personal computer business by Lenovo Group Ltd., a Chinese company. 38
The CEJUS cleared the transaction on the condition that IBM transfer per-
sonnel from IBM units not being acquired to a separate facility. 39
31. 31 C.F.R. §§ 800.404, 800.504 (2004).
32. 31 C.F.R. § 800.505.
33. Press Release, ASM Lithography, ASML Sells Tinsley Laboratories Inc. to SSG
Precision Optronics Inc. (Dec. 19, 2001). The SVG subsidiary involved was Tinsley
Laboratories, a lens polishing company that CFIUS deemed a threat to national security
because it had been involved in the Strategic Defense Initiative nine years ago. Ian Cam-
eron, Litho Merger Has Strings Attached, ELECTRONICS TIMES, May 14, 2001, at 6.
34. See e.g., Berman, supra note 1.
35. See Hutchison Whampoa Pulls Out of Global Crossing Deal, supra note 28; Lee,
supra note 2.
36. F.C.C., supra note 2.
37. Berman, supra note 1.
38. Government Oversight Body CFIUS Clears IBM PC Division's Sale to China's
Lenovo, DAILY REPORT FOR EXECUTIVES (BNA), Mar. 11, 2005, at A-19 [hereinafter CFIUS
Clears IBM PC Division's Sale].
39. Id.
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High-profile Exon-Florio cases like ASML/SVG, Hutchison/Global
Crossing, Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream, and IBM/Lenovo can become
politically charged, as members of Congress and others sometimes urge the
Administration to block transactions. 40 For example, Congress held hear-
ings on the Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream case.4 1
B. Export Controls
The United States restricts exports and reexports of a variety of goods,
services, software, and technology. There are many different U.S. export
control regimes, but the foremost sets of regulations are the Export Admin-
istration Regulations (the "EAR") 4 2 and the International Traffic in Arms
Regulations (the "ITAR"). 4 3 The EAR, administered by the Commerce
Department, apply to commercial items that are considered to have secur-
ity-sensitive applications, including a variety of electronics, aerospace, and
machine tool products ("dual use" items). 44 The ITAR are administered by
the State Department and are targeted toward military items ("defense arti-
cles" and "defense services"). 4 5 Both the EAR and the ITAR include lists of
items that are subject to license requirements. 4 6 Companies that produce
or export defense articles or provide defense services must register with
the State Department.4 7
Paradoxically, export controls apply to some purely domestic trans-
fers. Under "deemed export" rules of the EAR, a license can be required to
release controlled technology or software to a foreign national in the
United States. 48 The transfer is deemed to be an export to the recipient's
home country. 4 9 Deemed export restrictions can be particularly onerous
in connection with employment of non-U.S. engineers because providing
40. See, e.g., CFIUS Clears IBM PC Division's Sale, supra note 38 (noting that three
House of Representatives committee chairmen wrote to the Secretary of the Treasury in
opposition to clearance of IBM/Lenovo transaction); Spiegel, supra note 23 (discussing
governmental opposition to the Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream transaction); Frank J.
Gaffney, Jr., Defense Fire-Sale Redux, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2001, at A15 (discussing vari-
ous governmental opposition to the ASML/SVG transaction).
41. See, e.g., Foreign Government Ownership of American Telecommunications Compa-
nies: Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications, Trade and Consumer Protec-
tion of the Committee on Commerce, 106th Cong. (2000) [hereinafter Telecom Hearings].
42. 15 C.F.R. pts. 730-74 (2004).
43. 22 C.F.R. pts. 120-30 (2004).
44. See 15 C.F.R. § 774, supp. 1 (2004).
45. 22 C.F.R. § 120.1(a) (2004).
46. For the EAR, see the Commerce Control List in 15 C.F.R. § 774, supp. 1. For the
ITAR, see the U.S. Munitions List in 22 C.F.R. § 121.1 (2004).
47. 22 C.F.R. pt. 122 (2004). Even a manufacturer who merely produces and does
not export the defense articles needs to register. 22 C.F.R. § 122.1 (2004).
48. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (2004); see also 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(4)-(5) (2004)
(defining "export" in part as "disclosing ... or transferring technical data to a foreign
person, whether in the United States or abroad; or ... [plerforming a defense service on
behalf of, or for the benefit of, a foreign person, whether in the United States or
abroad"). However, deemed export restrictions do not apply to releases to lawful perma-
nent residents of the United States. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii); 22 C.F.R. § 120.15
(defining "U.S. person" to include lawful permanent residents).
49. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
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the employees with access to controlled technical data and software in, for
example, databases, can require a license.50
Export controls can complicate corporate transactions in several ways.
First, the parties often must have outstanding export licenses and other
export approvals transferred from pre-transaction parties to parties surviv-
ing the transaction.5 1 Similarly, corporate transactions can occasion the
need for amended or new ITAR registrations,5 2 which require government
approval.5 3
Second, the ITAR require notifications regarding certain types of cor-
porate transactions involving ITAR-registered companies. 5 4 Furthermore,
the State Department sometimes conducts informal reviews of the transac-
tion and the parties in connection with transfers of export approvals and
registration changes. These reviews purportedly ensure that the party
resulting from the transaction is a reliable exporter. Reviews under the
ITAR are particularly searching with respect to acquisitions of U.S. opera-
tions by non-U.S. companies.
Third, the State Department takes the position that some foreign
acquisitions, particularly those involving aircraft and satellites, actually
require State Department approval. 55
Fourth, export control considerations can bear substantially on Exon-
Florio cases. CFIUS members evaluate parties' export control practices,
including their compliance records, in assessing whether the proposed
transaction would threaten the national security. 56 A target U.S. company
that generates or holds sensitive export-controlled technology tends to cre-
ate more intensive scrutiny under Exon-Florio.5 7
Fifth, an acquiring company can be held liable for export control vio-
lations committed by the acquired operations before the transaction. In
1997, Sigma-Aldrich Corporation ("SAC") purchased the assets of Research
Biochemicals Limited Partnership ("RBLP"). 5 8 In assessing penalties
against SAC for RBLP's pre-acquisition violations, the Commerce Depart-
ment established that successor liability applied notwithstanding that: (1)
the acquisition was a purchase of assets rather than the purchase of a com-
50. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
51. See 22 C.F.R. § 122.4 (2004).
52. See id.
53. See, e.g., 22 C.F.R. § 122.4(d).
54. 22 C.F.R. § 122.4. For instance, a registrant must notify the State Department of
"any intended sale or transfer to a foreign person of ownership or control of the regis-
trant .... . Id.
55. 22 C.F.R. § 123.8 (2004).
56. See W. Robert Shearer, Comment, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Leg-
islation Subject to Abuse, 30 Hous. L. REv. 1729, 1762-66 (1993) (describing how export
controls impacted investigations of transactions involving Fairchild Industries/Matra,
Unisoft Group/CMC, and LTV/Thomson); cf. CFJUS Clears IBM PC Division's Sale,
supra note 38 (noting that three Congressmen complained that the transaction under
review "'may transfer ... export-controlled technology' to the Chinese government.").
57. See id.
58. See Exporter Agrees To Pay $1.76M Fine, J. CoM. ONLINE, Nov. 4, 2002, Trade, at
WP.
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pany itself, which under common law generally does not subject the sur-
viving entity to successor liability and (2) the entity that held the assets
before the transaction, RBLP, continued to exist.5 9
Similarly, EDO Corporation of New York acquired Condor Systems of
California and, in the process, acquired its existing export compliance
problems. 60 In 2003, Condor Systems pled guilty to two violations con-
cerning false statements in an export license application for a signal
processing system sold to the Swedish military. 6 ' EDO Corporation ulti-
mately signed a consent agreement requiring payment of $2.5 million in
civil penalties for the violations. 62
Export control violations can result in severe civil and, potentially,
criminal penalties. 6 3 Civil penalties can include not just civil fines but also
orders forbidding participation in export transactions. 64 An export
"denial order" can be cataclysmic for companies that rely heavily on export
sales.
C. Economic Sanctions
The Treasury Department administers economic sanctions against a
variety of countries, governments, and private parties. These sanctions
include broad trade and investment embargos against, presently, Burma, 6 5
Cuba,6 6 Iran, 6 7 Sudan,68 and Syria.6 9 To varying degrees, these sanctions
broadly forbid economic interaction with the target country. 70 The Trea-
sury Department's economic sanctions also include measures forbidding
any dealings with designated individuals and entities, including the follow-
ing: (1) parties affiliated with a sanctioned country or government ("spe-
cially designated nationals"), 7 1 (2) parties connected to terrorist
59. Sigma-Aldrich, supra note 5, at 7-8, 10-11; see Geren, supra note 5, at 4.
60. See EDO, A Military Contractor, To Buy Rival's Assets, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2002,
at C4; Renae Merle, EDO Buys Darlington To Boost Defense Business, WASH. POST, Mar. 12,
2003, at E05.
61. State Settlement Deal Makes Due Diligence a Future Requirement, THE EXPORT
PRACTITIONER, May 2004, at 9-10; Henry K. Lee, Guilty Plea by Condor About Sale; False
Statements to Federal Officials, S.F. CHRON., Feb. 11, 2003, at B5.
62. Consent Agreement of EDO Corporation, at 2 (Nov. 24, 2003) (available at the
U.S. Dep't of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs and copy on file with authors).
63. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2000); 50 U.S.C. § 1705; 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (2004); 22
C.F.R. § 127.3.
64. 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(a)(2). These orders are called "denial of export privileges."
Id.
65. Exec. Order No. 13,310, 31 C.F.R. pt. 537 (2004); 68 Fed. Reg. 44,853 (Jul. 30,
2003).
66. 31 C.F.R. pt. 515 (2004).
67. 31 C.F.R. pt. 560 (2004).
68. 31 C.F.R. pt. 538 (2004).
69. Exec. Order No. 13,338, 69 Fed. Reg. 26,751 (May 13, 2004).
70. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. §§ 560.201, 560.204 (2004) (prohibiting "the importation
into the United States of any goods or services of Iranian origin" and "the exportation,
reexportation, sale, or supply ... of any goods, technology, or services to Iran..."); 31
C.F.R. § 537.201 (2004) (prohibiting "new investment in Burma by United States per-
sons. . .").
71. See, e.g., 31 C.F.R. § 500.306, app. A (2004).
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activities,7 2 and (3) parties connected to the international narcotics
trade. 7
3
After the September 2001 terrorist attacks, the Bush Administration
began sanctioning not only terrorists themselves but also parties who pro-
vide support for or are "otherwise associated with" a terrorist. 74 The
breadth of this sanction is unclear. For example, it is not known whether
the Treasury Department would apply it against a European electrical util-
ity that provides power to an entity that is found to be involved in interna-
tional terrorism.
Under a variety of circumstances, consummation of corporate transac-
tions can violate economic sanctions requirements. For example, a U.S.
company's purchase of a Mexican firm's assets can violate the Cuba
embargo if the acquired assets include supply contracts with a Cuban
entity.75 Likewise, investment in a joint venture could constitute a viola-
tion if other participants include sanctioned parties, such as certain Bur-
mese government entities.
76
Often, connections between a target foreign business and a sanctioned
country will not necessarily preclude, categorically, acquisition of the busi-
ness by a U.S. company, but such connections will nonetheless present
difficult compliance challenges after the transaction is completed. This
might be the case, for example, if a U.S. company acquires even a minority
interest in the shares of a German company that engages in significant
sales to an Iranian customer. The acquiring U.S. company will probably
encounter difficult questions about its compliance with a provision that
prohibits U.S. persons from "facilitating" actions by non-U.S. persons that
would violate the embargo if undertaken by a U.S. person. 77
Sanctions compliance can be challenging because requirements are
typically broad and are often ambiguously drafted. At the same time, the
Treasury Department sometimes adopts far-reaching, and often undocu-
mented, interpretations of the regulations. 78 As with export controls, vio-
lations of economic sanctions can result in severe criminal and civil
penalties. 79
72. 31 C.F.R. pts. 595-97 (2004). Such parties include governments that support
international terrorism and terrorist organizations. Id.
73. 31 C.F.R. pt. 598 (2004). All parties individually sanctioned by the Office of
Foreign Assets Control are listed at 31 C.F.R. ch. V, app. A.
74. Exec. Order No. 13,224, 31 C.F.R. § 594.201 (2004).
75. See 31 C.F.R. § 515.201(b) (2004).
76. See Exec. Order No. 13,310, 68 Fed. Reg. 44,853 (July 30, 2003).
77. See 31 C.F.R. § 560.208 (2004) ("[N]o United States person ... may approve,
finance, facilitate, or guarantee any transaction by a foreign person where the transac-
tion by that foreign person would be prohibited .. .if performed by a United States
person or within the United States.").
78. The court in Looper v. Morgan, for example, characterized a certain Treasury
Department Office of Foreign Assets Control interpretation as "Kafkaesque." Looper v.
Morgan, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10241, at 49 (S.D. Tex. 1995).
79. See, e.g., 50 U.S.C. § 1705 (2000).
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D. Industrial Security Rules and Other Government Contracting
Requirements
Government contracting regulations can also complicate corporate
transactions. Foremost among these are "industrial security" rules
designed to safeguard classified and other sensitive information held by
government contractors.
Industrial security requirements are administered through the
"National Industrial Security Program" ("NISP")8 0 and are embodied prin-
cipally in the NISP Operating Manual.8 1 As to defense contracting, the
NISP is administered by the Defense Department's Defense Security
Service.
8 2
Application of NISP requirements is based on administration of one or
more "facility clearances" held by the contractor.8 3 The government will
not disseminate classified information to a contractor unless it has a facil-
ity clearance. 8 4 In turn, contractor employees must have "personnel clear-
ances" to access classified information.8 5 There are a variety of specialized
industrial security rules, such as communications security or "COMSEC"
rules administered by the National Security Agency ("NSA"). 8 6
NISP rules regarding "foreign ownership, control, or influence"
("FOCI") 87 can present major challenges for acquisitions of U.S. govern-
ment contractors or contracting operations by non-U.S. persons. These
rules generally preclude a contractor from obtaining or retaining a facility
clearance if it is under FOCI.8 8 The NISP Operating Manual provides for a
variety of methods to negate FOCI risk, including special contractual
arrangements and, if necessary, voting trust or proxy agreements whereun-
der U.S. citizens exercise the voting rights of a foreign owner.8 9 Address-
ing FOCI is especially difficult if the acquisition target holds particularly
sensitive data, such as Top Secret or COMSEC information. 90
Government contracting requirements apart from industrial security
rules can also give rise to unusual risks for parties to corporate transac-
tions. For example:
80. Exec. Order No. 12,829 (Jan. 6, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 3,479 (Jan. 8, 1993), as
amended by Exec. Order No. 12,885 (Dec. 14, 1993), 58 Fed. Reg. 65,863 (Dec. 16,
1993), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/eo12829.htm.
81. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NAT'L INDUS. SECURITY PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL, DoD
5220.22-M (Jan. 1995) [hereinafter NISPOM]; DEP'T OF DEFENSE, NAT'L INDUS. SECURITY
PROGRAM OPERATING MANUAL SUPPLEMENT, DoD 5220.22-M-Sup (Feb. 1995).
82. Defense Security Service, DSS: Who We Are, at http://www.dss.mil/aboutdss/
index.htm (last updated Feb. 16, 2005).
83. NISPOM, supra note 81, at §§ 2-100, 2-102.
84. Id. at § 2-100.
85. Id. at § 2-104.
86. DEP'T OF DEFENSE, COMSEC SUPPL. TO INDUS. SECURITY MANUAL FOR SAFEGUARD-
ING CLASSIFIED INFORMATION, DoD 5220.22-S (Mar. 1988).
87. NISPOM, supra note 81, at § 2-300-2-311.
88. Id. at § 2-301.
89. Id. at § 2-306.
90. See id. at § 2-302.
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* Limitations on transfers of interests in government contracts can
complicate financing arrangements;9 1
• In some circumstances, corporate transactions can trigger the need
for government approval to "novate" government contracts; 92
* Contracting "debarment" and "suspension" rules can render a tar-
get company ineligible for new contracts;
9 3
* The U.S. government ordinarily has special rights to terminate gov-
ernment contracts;
9 4
* There are myriad special bases for legal exposure in government
contracting, including liability for providing the government with
inaccurate or incomplete product cost or pricing data;9 5 and
* Government contracting rules provide for special, and sometimes
disadvantageous, rules regarding allocation of intellectual property
rights.9 6
As with export controls, government contracting considerations can
weigh heavily on the government's decisionmaking in Exon-Florio cases.
Ordinarily, the CFIUS will not clear the transaction unless it is evident that
the parties will take requisite steps to satisfy industrial security require-
ments. In the case of Hutchison Whampoa's proposed acquisition of
Global Crossing, however, the most intrusive safeguards against FOCI were
found to be insufficient to neutralize national security risks.
9 7
E. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Other Antibribery Measures
The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (the "FCPA") was enacted in 1977
to combat U.S. companies' use of illicit payments to advance their business
interests overseas. 9 8 It has two components: (1) a prohibition on overseas
corrupt payments and related actions 99 and (2) accounting control and
recordkeeping rules that companies subject to U.S. securities regulations
must observe, regardless of whether they are involved in foreign
activities.' 0 0
The FCPA antibribery provisions forbid not only direct bribery of for-
eign officials by U.S. companies, but also any payment by a U.S. company
if that company knows or is aware of a "high probability" that the funds
91. See 31 U.S.C. § 3727 (2000); 41 U.S.C. § 15 (2000); 48 C.F.R. §§ 32.802, 32.805
(2004).
92. See id.
93. 48 C.F.R. §§ 3.104-7, 9.405 (2004).
94. 48 C.F.R. §§ 49.502, 49.503, 52.249-1 to 52.249-7 (2004).
95. 48 C.F.R. § 15-407-1 (2004).
96. See 48 C.F.R. pt. 27 (2004).
97. Hutchison Whampoa Pulls Out of Global Crossing Deal, supra note 28; Lee, supra
note 2.
98. See Lynne Baum, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 823, 823
(1998).
99. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2000). This prohibition applies to issuers, domestic
concerns, and persons other than issuers and domestic concerns. Id.
100. 15 tJ.S.C. § 78m(b) (2000); see also Baum, supra note 98 for an overview of the
FCPA.
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will be subsequently used for a corrupt payment. 10 ' This potential expo-
sure for payments to third parties, particularly overseas sales agents and
joint venture partners, is often the most challenging aspect of the FCPA. 102
In 1997, the United States, the other twenty-eight members of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, and five non-
members entered into the Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Public Officials in International Business (the "Antibribery Conven-
tion"). 0 3 The Antibribery Convention commits the signatories to estab-
lish bribery of foreign officials as a criminal offense, as the FCPA does. 10 4
Parties to a corporate transaction should consider the potential for risk of
liability under other countries' measures against overseas bribery that
implement the Antibribery Convention in addition to the FCPA. 0 5
Companies may be fined up to $2 million or twice the gain or loss
from the offense for violations of the FCPA antibribery provisions.' 0 6 Indi-
viduals can be fined up to $250,000 or up to twice the gain or loss, impris-
oned up to five years, or both for willful violations. 10 7 Companies and
individuals can also be assessed up to $10,000 per violation in civil
penalties. '0 8
F. Anti-Money Laundering Requirements
Since 1986, U.S. law has forbidden money laundering as a substantive
101. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3), 78dd-3(a)(3); see also § 78dd-
1(f)(2)(B) (defining knowledge as the awareness "of a high probability of the existence
of a particular circumstance, unless the person actually believes that such circumstance
does not exist").
102. For example, Lockheed Martin's planned acquisition of Titan Corporation was
recently called off in light of a Justice Department foreign bribery investigation into
payments made by Titan's international consultants that were uncovered during due
diligence reviews. Ellen McCarthy, Post-9/1 I Mergers Brought Problems; Government Ser-
vice Firms Often Leaped Before They Looked, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2004, at E01; Titan
Facing SEC Charges, WASH. POST, June 5, 2004, at E02.
103. See Nora M. Rubin, Comment, A Convergence of 1996 and 1997 Global Efforts to
Curb Corruption and Bribery in International Business Transactions: The Legal Implica-
tions of the OECD Recommendations and Convention for the United States, Germany, and
Switzerland, 14 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 257, 283-88 (1998); Banning Bribes, Finally, WASH.
POST, Nov. 28, 1997, at A26; see also International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition
Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998).
104. Rubin, supra note 103, at 286-87.
105. See Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Steps
Taken and Planned Future Actions by Participating Countries To Ratify and Implement the
Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Business
Transactions, June 19, 2003 (describing legislation promulgated by OECD countries to
implement the Antibribery Convention), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/
50/33/1827022.pdf.
106. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(e), 78ff; 18 U.S.C. § 3571 (2000).
107. Id. See generally Bus. Info. Serv. for the Newly Independent States, Foreign Cor-
rupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, at http://www.bisnis.doc.gov/bisnis/fcpl.htm
(last visited Nov. 13, 2003); U.S. Dep't of Justice and U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act Antibribery Provisions, at http://www.usdoj.gov/criminal/fraud/
fcpa/dojdocb.htm (last updated Mar. 15, 2002) (discussing penalties including the
Alternative Fines Act).
108. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-3(e).
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crime. 10 9 The Money Laundering Control Act prohibits parties from
knowingly conducting a financial transaction that involves proceeds from
specified types of unlawful activity.1 10
The Congress strengthened and expanded U.S. anti-money laundering
requirements through the "USA Patriot Act," enacted shortly after the Sep-
tember 2001 terrorist attacks."' As required by this legislation, the Trea-
sury Department is engaged in a broad variety of rulemakings to extend
anti-money laundering requirements to a range of commercial sectors
beyond banks and other traditional financial institutions. 1 2 Newly regu-
lated industries include, for example, securities brokerages, mutual funds,
and operators of credit card systems."
t3
In addition to expanding the scope of regulated industries, the USA
Patriot Act imposes broader anti-money laundering obligations on finan-
cial institutions. For example, covered entities must now establish a proto-
col for screening customers. 114 At a minimum, firms must institute
procedures for verifying the identity of anyone wanting to open an account,
maintaining records of the information used to verify identity, and estab-
lishing whether the potential customer appears on terrorist lists provided
to the firm by any governmental agency. 1 i s
The USA Patriot Act also requires firms to establish due diligence mea-
sures designed to prevent and detect money laundering. 1 16 Mandatory
109. Jonathan H. Hecht, Comment, Airing the Dirty Laundry: The Application of the
United States Sentencing Guidelines to White Collar Money Laundering Offenses, 49 AM. U.
L. REv. 289, 294-96 (1999) (providing a background on money laundering legislation).
110. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956(a), 1957(a) (1994), amended by Antiterrorism and Effective
Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214, 1301-02 (1996).
111. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required To
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 272 (2001)
(to be codified at 31 U.S.C. § 5318) [hereinafter Patriot Act].
112. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Treasury Office of Public Affairs, Treasury
Department USA Patriot Act Update (Apr. 23, 2002), at http://www.treas.gov/press/re
leases/po3034.htm.
113. Id.
114. Patriot Act § 326.
115. 31 U.S.C. § 5318(l)(2). For final rules regarding customer identification pro-
grams, see 31 C.F.R. pt. 103 (2004). For examples of previous rulemakings, see Cus-
tomer Identification Programs for Financial Institutions, 68 Fed. Reg. 55,335 (Sept. 25,
2003); Customer Identification Programs for Banks, Savings Associations, Credit
Unions and Certain Non-Federally Regulated Banks, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,090 (May 9, 2003);
Customer Identification Programs for Broker-Dealers, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,113 (May 9,
2003); Customer Identification Programs for Futures Commission Merchants and Intro-
ducing Brokers, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,149 (May 9, 2003); Customer Identification Programs
for Mutual Funds, 68 Fed. Reg. 25,131 (May 9, 2003). For a Treasury Department
notice of proposed rulemaking for customer identification programs, see Customer
Identification Programs for Certain Banks Lacking a Federal Functional Regulator, 68
Fed. Reg. 25,163 (May 9, 2003).
116. Patriot Act § 312. For final rules implementing Section 312, see 31 C.F.R. pt.
103. For examples of previous rulemakings including sample proposed, interim, and
final rules implementing Section 312, see Special Due Diligence Programs for Certain
Foreign Accounts, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,348 (July 23, 2002); Amendment to the Bank Secrecy
Act Regulations-Requirement that Brokers or Dealers in Securities Report Suspicious
Transactions, 67 Fed. Reg. 44,048 (July 1, 2002); Due Diligence Anti-Money Laundering
Programs for Certain Foreign Accounts, 67 Fed. Reg. 37,736 (proposed May 30, 2002).
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anti-money laundering programs must include, for example, designation of
a compliance officer, an ongoing employee training program, and an inde-
pendent audit function to test the programs.117
Given expanded anti-money laundering requirements and enforce-
ment priorities, anti-money laundering due diligence is increasingly impor-
tant for corporate transactions.
G. Anti-Boycott Rules
The United States maintains two sets of policies designed primarily to
prevent compliance with the Arab League's boycott of Israel. These mea-
sures are complex and counterintuitive in many respects.
The Commerce Department administers rules that generally forbid
U.S. companies and their controlled overseas affiliates, among other things,
to refuse, knowingly agree to refuse, or require any other person to refuse
to do business with or in Israel. 118 Separately, federal income tax provi-
sions withhold a variety of tax benefits from U.S. taxpayers if they or cer-
tain related parties "participate in or cooperate with" the boycott. 119 Both
sets of measures require U.S. companies to report certain types of boycott-
related communications. 120 However, many aspects of the two sets of mea-
sures are inconsistent, with certain activities implicating one but not the
other set.
117. Patriot Act § 352. For final rules implementing Section 352, see 31 C.F.R. pt.
103. For examples of previous rulemakings including proposed and interim final rules
issued under Section 352, see Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Commodity Trading
Advisors, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,640 (proposed May 5, 2003); Anti-Money Laundering Pro-
grams for Investment Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 23,646 (proposed May 5, 2003); Anti-
Money Laundering Program Requirements for "Persons Involved in Real Estate Closings
and Settlements," 68 Fed. Reg. 17,569 (advance notice of proposed rulemaking Apr. 10,
2003); Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones or Jew-
els, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,155 (correction of Mar. 13, 2003 to proposed rule); Anti-Money
Laundering Programs for Businesses Engaged in Vehicle Sales, 68 Fed. Reg. 8,568
(advanced notice of proposed rule Feb. 24, 2003); Anti-Money Laundering Programs for
Travel Agencies, 68 Fed. Reg. 8,571 (advanced notice of proposed rule Feb. 24, 2003);
Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Dealers in Precious Metals, Stones or Jewels, 68
Fed. Reg. 8,480 (proposed Feb. 21, 2003); Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Insur-
ance Companies, 67 Fed. Reg. 68,540 (correction of Nov. 12, 2002 to proposed rule);
Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Financial Institutions, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,110 (Apr.
29, 2002); Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Money Services Businesses, 67 Fed.
Reg. 21,114 (Apr. 29, 2002); Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Mutual Funds, 67
Fed. Reg. 21,117 (Apr. 29, 2002); Anti-Money Laundering Programs for Operators of a
Credit Card System, 67 Fed. Reg. 21,121 (Apr. 29, 2002); Anti-Money Laundering Pro-
grams for Insurance Companies, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,625 (proposed Sept. 26, 2002); Anti-
Money Laundering Programs for Unregistered Investment Companies, 67 Fed. Reg.
60,617 (proposed Sept. 26, 2002); cf. Recordkeeping and Termination of Correspondent
Accounts for Foreign Banks, 67 Fed. Reg. 78,383 (Dec. 24, 2002) (extending time for
certain financial institutions to comply with anti-money laundering requirements pursu-
ant to Patriot Act §§ 313(a) and 319(b)); Recordkeeping and Termination of Correspon-
dent Accounts for Foreign Banks, 67 Fed. Reg. 60,562 (Sept. 26, 2002) (to be codified at
31 C.F.R. pt. 103).
118. See 15 C.F.R. § 760.2 (2004).
119. 26 U.S.C. § 999 (2000).
120. 26 U.S.C. § 999(a)(1); 15 C.F.R. § 760.5.
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The complexities and obscurities of the anti-boycott requirements can
make compliance challenging, especially for companies that do substantial
business in the Middle East. Furthermore, following the practice estab-
lished in the SAC case described above, 1 2 1 the Commerce Department
recently established that an acquiring company can be held liable for pre-
acquisition anti-boycott violations of the target company.
12 2
II. How International Trade and Security Policies Can Affect a
Corporate Transaction and Its Outcome
A party planning or executing a corporate transaction should be mind-
ful of three ways in which U.S. international trade and security policies
could bear on the transaction and the company or companies emerging
from the transaction.
First, the transaction could require or occasion the need for one or
more government approvals or clearances under U.S. international trade
and security statutes and regulations.
The likelihood that the parties will need to approach the U.S. govern-
ment for one or more approvals or clearances is particularly pronounced if
the transaction entails a non-U.S. party's acquisition of control over U.S.
operations. Most obviously, it might be advisable to pursue an Exon-Florio
clearance. In addition, however, foreign acquisitions can give rise to a need
for export control and industrial security authorizations.
Even in the absence of the need for formal U.S. government approval,
there may be sound reasons to meet with U.S. government officials to alert
them to the transaction, avoid misunderstandings, and minimize confu-
sion. Because the U.S. government can often be a significant regulator or
customer, informal support from U.S. officials can often be helpful. In
addition, there may be political reasons to confer with U.S. officials.
Second, compliance issues that require resolution before or after clos-
ing could emerge.
Typical compliance concerns might include, for example: "deemed
export" violations involving the U.S. acquisition target's employment of
Chinese or Russian engineers, 123 sanctions violations involving the U.S.
acquisition target's arrangements to supply components to a French com-
pany because the finished French systems are dedicated to a particular Ira-
nian customer,' 24 foreign corrupt payments involving a U.K. acquisition
target's irregular payments to third country government officials,125 and
an Australian acquisition target's unreported boycott-related inquiries from
the Arab League which contravene U.S. requirements because the target
company was controlled by a U.S. company. 12 6
121. See supra Part I.B.
122. Sigma-Aldrich, supra note 5.
123. See supra Part I.B.
124. See supra Part I.C.
125. See supra Part I.E.
126. See supra Part I.G.
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Compliance concerns do not necessarily involve legal violations. For
example, the target financial company could lack an adequate anti-money
laundering compliance system. This inadequacy might not violate any
legal requirements but would nonetheless need to be resolved. 
12 7
The parties will often want to resolve compliance concerns before clos-
ing by taking steps similar to those described in the next section. For
example, they should implement changes before closing if the target com-
pany is noncompliant or if closure itself would violate economic sanctions
requirements. The latter might be true if, for instance, the target is a Mexi-
can firm that has supply relationships with Cuban entities. 12 8
Third, compliance or security issues can come to the U.S. govern-
ment's attention before or after the transaction is consummated.
For a variety of reasons, corporate transactions often result in greater
visibility for the parties in the eyes of executive branch agencies and con-
gressional offices. Government officials are exposed to media reports
about the transactions. Business rivals worried about the transaction's
impact on competitive forces could try to impede it through reports to the
government. Employees who are dissatisfied with or apprehensive about
how the transaction will affect them may report compliance issues to
enforcement officials.
Any number of adverse developments can follow the government's dis-
covery of compliance issues or circumstances that indicate that the transac-
tion will undermine U.S. security interests: an administrative investigation
or enforcement proceeding;12 9 a criminal investigation or prosecution;
130
congressional investigations, hearings, or efforts by congressional offices
to affect an executive branch agency's approach to the issue; 13 ' share-
holder suits;13 2 and negative publicity. 133 The repercussions from nega-
tive publicity can be particularly adverse, as the company might be
characterized not simply as a lawbreaker but also as a threat to U.S.
security.
Developments of this kind can complicate and delay consummation of
the transaction. In addition to cost and inconvenience, such developments
127. See supra Part I.F.
128. See supra Part I.C; 31 C.F.R. pt. 515.
129. For example, potential foreign acquisition of U.S. interests triggers an Exon-
Florio review process conducted by CFIUS. See, e.g., Berman, supra note 1.
130. An example includes investigations and prosecutions for foreign corrupt prac-
tices. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-3(e), 78ff.
131. An example of a congressional hearing includes the hearings held in the
Deutsche Telekom/VoiceStream case. See Telecom Hearings, supra note 41.
132. See, e.g., Howes v. Ashland Oil, Inc., No. 87-5939, 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 10306,
at 2 (6th Cir. 1991) (shareholder's derivative action alleging that defendant's manage-
ment violated the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act).
133. See, e.g., Seth Lubove, PET Project: Little Noticed Until It was Hit by a Corporate
Scandal, Syncor Now Has To Convince Folks That It Still Has a Future, FORBES.COM, Dec.
23, 2002 (describing consequences for Syncor International's reputation after company
officials allegedly made illegal overseas payments), at http://www.forbes.com/forbes/
2002/1223/070a-print.html.
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can result in extensive legal liability for one or more parties to the transac-
tion or for the company that results from the transaction.
As noted above, irregular payments discovered during due diligence
severely disrupted a recent merger between two U.S. healthcare companies.
Cardinal Health, the company seeking to acquire Syncor International Cor-
poration ("Syncor"), discovered during due diligence that Syncor affiliates
had made illicit payments to government healthcare providers in Taiwan
and at least four other countries in connection with the company's sale of
health supplies.134 As a result, the Justice Department and the Securities
and Exchange Commission ("SEC") investigated the company, leading to
delay and renegotiation of the transaction.13 5 The merger proceeded only
after $2.5 million in penalties and the resignation of Syncor's chairman. 13 6
Similarly, due diligence uncovered problems with alleged corrupt pay-
ments in connection with Lockheed Martin's planned acquisition of Titan
Corporation. 137 Unlike the Syncor transaction, Titan could not overcome
FCPA compliance concerns by working with U.S. officials following a vol-
untary disclosure, and Lockheed Martin withdrew from the transaction. 13 8
III. Steps To Minimize Risk And Successfully Complete Corporate
Transactions
Given intensified visibility and scrutiny by enforcement authorities
and the Congress, and the significant exposure to adverse consequences as
described above, companies should address international trade and secur-
ity policies with at least as much care as they address, for example, tax,
pension, and environmental policies.
Parties considering a corporate transaction should, at the outset, iden-
tify and assess the magnitude of international trade and security-related
policy concerns. Relevant variables include, for example, expected partici-
pation in the transaction by non-U.S. parties; connections between parties
and compliance-sensitive activities, such as whether a party is a defense
contractor, technology company, oil company, or financial company; con-
nections between parties and compliance-sensitive areas of the world, such
as the Middle East, central or southeast Asia, or Africa; and a party's heavy
134. Syncor Int'l Corp., Exchange Act Release No. 46,979 (Dec. 10, 2002), available at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/34-46979.htm [hereinafter Syncor Int'l Release];
Lubove, supra note 133.
135. See Andrew Morse, Cardinal Sin, COR. CONTROL ALERT, Dec. 23, 2002, at 4, avail-
able at http://www.thedeal.com/im/DF/pdf/V19N10.pdf; Press Release, U.S. Dep't of
Justice, Syncor Taiwan, Inc. Pleads Guilty to Violating the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(Dec. 10, 2002); SEC v. Syncor Int'l Corp., SEC Litigation Release No. 17,887 (Dec. 10,
2002), at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/litreleases/lrl7887.htm [hereinafter Syncor Liti-
gation Release]; Syncor Int'l Release, supra note 134.
136. See Company News: Cardinal to Still Acquire Syncor But At a Lower Price, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 5, 2002, at C5; Morse, supra note 135, at 4; Syncor Litigation Release, supra
note 135.
137. Jonathan Karp, Lockheed Says Probe Jeopardizes Takeover of Titan, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 8, 2004, at B2.
138. McCarthy, supra note 102.
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reliance on export markets. Thus, a Chinese company's proposed acquisi-
tion of a maker of military electronics would present vastly different con-
siderations than a wholly domestic issuance of debt securities by a U.S.
consumer products company.
Parties should also consider challenges in structuring a transaction. It
is useful for the parties at least to consider concerns regarding interna-
tional trade and security policies in developing the structure of the transac-
tion. For example, suppose a non-U.S. company proposes to acquire the
electronics operations of a U.S. company. One relatively minor component
of those operations is devoted to highly classified defense contracts. It
might be advisable for the acquisition to exclude that component.
Further, parties should complete due diligence and appropriately
address their findings. International trade and security due diligence
should be a standard feature of due diligence, in the same way that there is
standard tax and pensions due diligence. The character and breadth of
international trade and security due diligence should depend on variables
like those described above. Due diligence should be particularly intensive
in the case of, for instance, acquisition of a petroleum services company
with extensive operations in the Middle East. For a transaction that
involves reasonably pronounced international trade and security issues,
due diligence should involve, among other things, initial written inquiries
and interviews with company officials about the scope and nature of par-
ties' government businesses, overseas operations, export businesses, and
financial businesses; relevant internal compliance programs; and any rele-
vant compliance issues that have arisen. Parties conducting due diligence
should also review government contracts and industrial security clear-
ances; export authorizations, registrations, and classifications; compliance
disclosures to the U.S. government; documentation regarding compliance
investigations and findings; and internal compliance program documenta-
tion. Due diligence findings should be documented and analyzed in a
form that facilitates decisionmaking by the parties.
It might be useful for the parties to take a variety of steps to address
due diligence findings, including one or more of the following:
Negotiate Protective Contract Provisions: An acquiring party should
pursue provisions of the purchase agreement and perhaps other
instruments in order to allocate international trade and security-
related rights and obligations in a helpful manner. Relevant provi-
sions can include representations, closing conditions, and indem-
nifications. Contract provisions cannot, of course, protect against
non-monetary sanctions, including denial orders precluding partici-
pation in export transactions.
* Submit Requisite Government Notices and Pursue Requisite Govern-
ment Clearances and Approvals: A foremost international trade and
security-related clearance, as discussed above, is that by the CFIUS
under the Exon-Florio Amendment. Although not mandatory for
any transaction, it is prudent to pursue Exon-Florio clearance for
any transaction that involves both acquisition of control of U.S.
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operations by a non-U.S. person and any security-related sensitivi-
ties. Such sensitivities include, for example, defense contracting or
advanced technology activities. Other agencies, such as the State
Department and the Defense Department, may also require
approval.
* Make Internal Corporate Adjustments To Address Compliance Issues:
Due diligence can uncover relatively minor irregularities or corpo-
rate practices that might have resulted in modest noncompliance or
no noncompliance at all. For example, it might be discovered that
the company is not tracking the non-U.S. status of its employees to
guard against violations of "deemed export" rules, although no vio-
lations are evident. These types of issues can be addressed through
implementation or modification of internal compliance procedures.
* Complete More Intensive Factual Inquiries Regarding and Legal Assess-
ments of Identified Concerns: Sometimes identified issues merit
intensive internal investigation to develop and evaluate relevant
facts. This was true, for example, in connection with the recent
merger in the medical supply sector described above, in which due
diligence uncovered payments by the target company, Syncor, to
government-employed physicians in several foreign countries.13 9
Both Syncor and the acquiring party, Cardinal Health, undertook
extensive investigations to assess the extent of exposure under the
FCPA.140
* Disclose Compliance Issues to Government as Appropriate: In some
instances, the parties might discover violations and determine that
consummation of the transaction should be contingent on disclo-
sure to the government and resolution with government enforce-
ment authorities. In the case of the medical supply acquisition, the
facts were so egregious the acquirer made closing contingent on
confirmation by the Justice Department and the Securities and
Exchange Commission such that there would be no legal exposure
for the acquiring company, Cardinal Health. 14 1
Finally, parties sometimes should design and implement a govern-
ment relations strategy. Resolution of regulatory and compliance issues is
generally driven by the relevant facts. At the same time, it can be useful to
design and implement a strategy to disseminate an appropriate view of the
transaction among congressional and senior executive branch officials. As
discussed above, it has become common for U.S. companies seeking to
block a transaction to urge U.S. officials to act against the transaction
under the Exon-Florio Amendment, and congressional offices have offered
input in several high-profile Exon-Florio cases. 14 2 A thoughtful govern-
139. Morse, supra note 135.
140. Id.
141. Michael D. Goldhaber, Oil Company Bribery Suit Settles; Government Lays Out
Blueprint for Successor Liability in Resolving Case, NAT'L L. J., July 12, 2004, at 5.
142. See supra Part I.A.
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ment relations strategy can be critical to preventing or addressing these
types of developments.
Conclusion
International trade and security policies are becoming increasingly
relevant to corporate transactions. Parties that are considering a corporate
transaction are well-advised to consider carefully trade and security poli-
cies when they are planning and executing the transaction.

